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Whither the Accountability Theoy:
Second-Class Status for Third-Part
Refugees as a Threat to International
Refugee Protection
JENNIFER MOORE*

1. Introduction
The international refugee definition does not discriminate between victims
based upon the persecutor's affiliation or non-affiliation with the State.

While the majority of asylum States recognize this principle of equal
access under the 'protection theory," a minority of States, including
France and Germany, currently subscribe to a much more restrictive
concept of agency. Under the 'accountability theory,' refugee status is
limited to individuals who fear persecution at the hands of entities for
whose abusive acts the State is deemed responsible. In accountability
jurisdictions, so-called 'third-party refugees' 2 -

by non-State agents -

those who fear persecution

are denied protection.

This article cautions that the accountability theory strikes at the
very heart of international protection, by threatening the international
consensus underlying the provision of asylum to refugees. Part 2 presents

a conceptual analysis of the accountability theory and its fundamental
inconsistency with the principle of refugee protection. This philosophical
. Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., Amherst College
(1983);
'
J.D., Harvard Law School (1987). The author presented a draft of this article at the 7 Annual
Research and Advisory Panel of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration in
South Africa in January 2001. Thanks go to UNM law student Melissa Ewer for her valuable
research assistance.
1 The protection theory also may be referred to as the 'persecution theory'. The protection/
persecution theory focuses on the fact of persecution and the lack of protection. In contrast, it is the
character of the persecutor that is the overriding concern of the accountability theory.
2 See Adan v. Secretay of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 A.C. 293 [Adan I] at 306 A-B. Lloyd
Berwick held that 'for those who are sometimes called "third party refugees" ... if the state is unable
to provide protection ... the qualifications for refugee status are complete'. See below, n. 72.
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approach is followed in Part 3 by a pragmatic examination of the impact
of the accountability theory in the context of a regional burden-sharing
regime that allows a European State, under certain circumstances, to
return an asylum seeker to the country of first asylum. Part 3 concentrates
on two asylum cases from the United Kingdom: ex parte Adan and Aitseguer,3
decided by the House of Lords, and TL v. The United Kingdom,4 a case
ultimately brought before the European Court of Human Rights.
In ex parte Adan andAitseguer, the House of Lords blocked the return of a
Somali woman and an Algerian man to Germany and France, respectively,
where they had previously sojourned. The Law Lords reasoned that both
countries would likely return the asylum seekers to their countries of
origin because they feared persecution by non-State agents.5
By contrast, in T. v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights refused to block the return of a Sri Lankan 'third-party refugee'
to Germany, despite his previous denial of asylum by administrative
bodies in that country for lack of State complicity in his feared persecution.
Notwithstanding its endorsement of the protection theory, the Court
permitted T.I.'s return to Germany based on its speculation that he might
be eligible for an alternative temporary form of protection under the
German Aliens Act.6
Taken together, ex parte Adan and Aitseguer and TI. v. United Kingdom
clarify that when an asylum seeker arrives in an accountability theory
jurisdiction, first, and moves on to a protection jurisdiction, second, it
matters little that a majority of States subscribe to the broader protection
principle, if in fact, that person risks removal to a country that may return
him or her to persecution by non-State agents. In a European legal
climate which places severe limits on 'forum-shopping' by refugees, the
protection theory cannot afford to be embraced by a mere majority of
States. Rather, protection for victims of both State and non-State
persecution should be the consensus of all members of the international
community. Moreover, protection theory adherents must refuse to return
asylum seekers to accountability jurisdictions until such time that the
protection theory has universal application.

3 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan and Aitseguer (U.K. House of Lords, 19
December 2000; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 143); reprinted below, 202-29, [hereinafter ex parte Adan and
Aitseguer], affirming R v. Secretagy of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer
(U.K. Court of Appeal, 23 Jul. 1999; [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1274) [hereinafter Ex parte Adan et afl.
4 TI.v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 7 Mar. 2000; 12 IJRL 244 (2000).
5 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, opinion of Lord Hutton, para. 7.
6 TI. v. United Kingdom, 17-18.
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2. The protection theory and the accountability theory:
Thesis and antithesis
The definition of a refugee set forth in Article I of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees does not define the character of the
actor whose persecution is feared by the asylum seeker. A refugee is
someone outside their country of origin with 'a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion', who is either unable or unwilling
to avail themselves of the protection of that country.'7 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency responsible for
providing protection and assistance to refugees worldwide, instructs that
the silence of the Refugee Convention regarding the agency of persecution
must be read expansively, such that 'offensive acts ... committed by the
local populace ... can be considered as persecution ... if the authorities
refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection."
As Goodwin-Gill indicates in his treatise on international refugee law,
'the issue of State responsibility for persecution ... is not part of the
refugee definition.'9 Further, Goodwin-Gill explains, 'there is no basis in
the 1951 Convention ... for requiring the existence of effective operating
institutions of government as a pre-condition to a successful claim to
refugee status." Thus, according to both conventional international law
and scholarly interpretation, the State is not the necessary agent of
persecution, nor is a functional State backdrop to persecution a prerequisite
to the provision of surrogate international protection to refugees."
Despite international legal dictates regarding the agency of persecution,
State practice differs considerably regarding the recognition of the equal
claim to international protection on the part of refugees fearing nonState agents of persecution. A majority of Western asylum States, including
Australia, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States,
subscribe to the so-called 'protection theory' which encompasses victims
of unofficial and official persecution alike.' 2 However, a minority of
European States, including Germany and France, have crafted the more
Art. I(A)(2) CSR5 1; emphasis added.

o UNHCR, Handbook on Proceduresand Criteriafor DeterminingRefugee Status, Geneva, 1979, [hereinafter
the UNHCR Handbook], para. 65; emphasis added.
9 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in InternationalLaw, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 d edn.,
1996, 73.
'0Ibid., 73-4.
11See also, Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden,
vol. 1, 1966, 191, 192;James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1991,
124. See generally, Jennifer Moore, 'From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection for
Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents,' 31 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 82, Fall, 1999.
12 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, opinion of Lord Slynn of Hadley, para. 3 and opinion of Lord Steyn,
para. 6. See also, Moore, above n. 11, at 108 n. 70.
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restrictive 'accountability theory,' which bars protection to refugees fleeing
persecution by certain non-State actors.

The accountability theory as a basis for the denial of refugee status
has a more limited application to the specific context of a so-called 'failed

State,' as demonstrated by Germany's denial of asylum to refugees from
Somalia and Afghanistan in recent years. 3 However, it has also been
applied more generally by France and some of its neighbours to refugees
from any State, embattled yet functional, which is unable to provide
4
protection in a given circumstance, often due to internal armed conflict.
In the case of the broadest application of the accountability theory,
refugee protection will only be granted in two situations: either the State

must be the persecutor, or the State must be unwilling but able to protect
against persecution by non-State agents.

5

Where the State lacks the

capacity to prevent or punish persecution by other entities, whether
insurgents, clans, subclans or criminals, a legalistic interpretation places
the victims of such persecution outside the refugee definition. The technical
significance of the accountability theory is that it replaces the more
embracing 'unable or unwilling to protect' standard in paragraph 65 of the
UNHCR Handbook 6 with a more demanding 'unwilling but able to protect'
requirement. The human result is that refugees fleeing varying degrees
of State dysfunction are left out in the cold.
While a denial of status to those refugees fleeing non-State persecution
is a clear violation of the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention and a

significant dilution of the availability of international protection in those
States that subscribe to the accountability theory, unfortunately the
problem is not so contained or containable. The tear in the fabric of
international protection caused by the accountability theory becomes an
unravelling hole in the context of a regional burden-sharing regime in
13 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BverwG] 9 C 15/96, judgment of 15 Apr. 1997, and BverwG 9 C
38/96, judgment of 15 Apr. 1997 [Federal Administrative Court of the Federal Republic of Germany]
(both involving Somali applicants); and BverwG 9 C 34/96, judgment of 4 Nov. 1997 [Federal
Administrative Court] (group of Afghans). See also 'Sri Lankan Tamil Case,' decided by the German
Federal Constitutional Court in 1989, below n. 15; Ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion,
para. 3 and Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 7;J. Moore, above n. 11, at 108, n. 69.
14 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion, para. 6 and Lord Steyn's opinion, para. II
(asylum seekers from Somalia and Algeria whose claims were previously denied by Germany and
France, respectively). VwGH 11.03.1992, 93/18/008 (Austrian immigration authority denying
asylum to applicant for feared so-called private persecution).
'5 This restrictive definition of agents of persecution was set out in 1996 in a non-binding
instrument of the European Union. See Joint Position 96/196/JHA Defined by the Council on the
Basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of the European Union on the Harmonized Application of the
Definition of the Term 'Refugee' in Article I of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to
the Status of Refugees, 1996 OJ. (L63/2), para. 5.2, suggesting that persecution requires human
rights abuses perpetrated, 'encouraged or permitted' by the State. It is also reflected in the so-called
'Sri Lankan Tamil Case' decided by the German Federal Constitutional Court [FCC] in 1989. See
BVefGE 80, 315, decision of 10 July 1989, 2 BvR 502/86, 1000/86, 961/86, in which the Court
held that political persecution requires persecution by the State.
16 Above, n. 8.
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which a European Union member may return an asylum seeker to the
first Union member through whose territory he or she transited. 7 It is
the combination of the accountability theory and the application of the
first asylum country concept that is most threatening to both abstract
principles of refugee protection and the very practical plight of individual
refugees. The threat is particularly evident at present to those asylum
seekers in Europe who happen to pass through Germany or France before
seeking asylum in a country such as the United Kingdom.

3. Recent jurisprudence in the United Kingdom under
the Dublin Convention and the 1966 Asylum and
Immigration Appeals Act
Two recent asylum cases in the United Kingdom deal with one or more
individuals fearing non-State-sponsored persecution, and both involve the
possible removal of one or more asylum seekers to Germany or France
as provided under UK law. In the first case, the UK House of Lords,
affirming the Court of Appeal, protected the asylum seekers concerned
from return to Germany and France, respectively.18 In the second, the
European Court of Human Rights allowed the United Kingdom to return
an asylum seeker to Germany. 9 In both cases, the United Kingdom
recognized that the accountability theory was in violation of the spirit of
the 1951 Convention, and yet this finding did not consistently prevent
return to a country found to commit such a violation. The differential
outcome of the two asylum cases argues powerfully that the availability
of refugee protection to victims of State and non-State persecution alike
is a core value of the 1951 Refugee Convention that must be recognized
by all members of the international community.
3.1 R v. Secretary of State, ex parte Adan et al
The cases of Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer were consolidated and
decided by the U.K. Court of Appeal in July 1999, in a judgment that
affirmed the protection principle as the correct interpretation of the
international refugee definition.2" The House of Lords then granted leave
to appeal in the cases of Adan and Aitseguer, and decided their cases in
17 See Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications
for Asylum
Lodged in One of the Member States of the [European] Community [Dublin Convention], 16June
1990, art. 7(l) ['The responsibility for examining an application for asylum shall be incumbent upon
the Member State responsible for controlling the entry of the alien into the territory of the Member
States ... '].
18 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, paras. 24 and 23, affirming ex parte Adan et al
in the Court of Appeal at 9; above, n. 3.
'9 TIL v. the United Kingdom at 19; above n. 4.
20 ex parte Adan et al, Court of Appeal, at 16.
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December 2000, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal.2 The
opinion of the Court of Appeals sheds light on the relevant facts and
background of the case, and arguably takes a somewhat more qualified
approach to the protection principle than that articulated by the House
of Lords. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal decision is first analyzed,
followed by an examination of the decision by the House of Lords.
3.1.1 The judgment of the Court of Appeal
ex parte Adan et al was a consolidated case heard by the Court of Appeal
in 1999, involving three asylum seekers from three different countries for
whom the United Kingdom was not the first country on whose territory
they sought protection. In each case, the U.K. Secretary of State had
summarily dismissed their claims, having certified that each applicant
was returnable to either Germany or France as a safe country of
first asylum under the Dublin Convention and the 1996 Asylum and
Immigration Appeals Act [hereinafter 1996 Act].22 Each applicant
appealed the dismissal of his or her claim, and the Court of Appeal
combined their cases.
The asylum seekers in ex parte Adan et al were Lul Adan, Sittampalan
Subaskaran and Hamid Aitseguer. Adan, a Somali woman, alleged past
persecution and the fear of future persecution by a rival clan in a situation
of total governmental collapse in her native country. The German
authorities had denied her asylum claim before she reached the United
Kingdom.23 Subaskaran, a Sri Lankan man, claimed past and future
persecution by the insurgent guerrilla force known as the LTTE or Tamil
24
Tigers. His application had also been denied previously in Germany.
Finally, Aitseguer, an Algerian man, had experienced and feared
persecution by Islamic fundamentalists; he passed through France on his
way to applying for asylum in the United Kingdom.25
Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer all lodged asylum applications with
the United Kingdom Home Office, and their applications were all
similarly dismissed without consideration of their merits under s. 2(2)(c)
of the 1996 Act; this allows the Home Secretary to remove an asylum
seeker to a country if assured 'that the government of that country or
territory would not send him to another country or territory otherwise
than in accordance with the [Refugee] Convention. ' 26 In each case, that
'other country,' Germany for Adan and Subaskaran, and France for
Aitseguer, had accepted responsibility for ultimately resolving the case
21 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 23.

22 ex parte Adan el al, Court of Appeal, 6-7.
23 Ibid., 2.

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 2-3.
26 Ibid., 2-3, 7, citing 1996 Act.
24
25
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under the terms of the Dublin Convention as the country of first asylum. 7
All three applicants appealed on the following grounds. Because both
Germany and France subscribe to the accountability theory of refugee
status, their claims would be wrongfully denied by either country, and
hence they would be returned to their country of origin in a manner
'otherwise than in accordance with the [Refugee] Convention.'28 Indeed,
the claims of Adan and Subaskaran had already been denied by
Germany.29
When the facts are examined more closely, it appears that Adan feared
that, because a rival clan had killed other members of her clan, the
same fate awaited her upon return. Under Germany's version of the
accountability theory, Somalia's status as a failed State with 'no de jure
or de facto State authority' made her 'fall outside the Convention.'3
Next, Subaskaran attested to a fear of persecution by the Tamil Tigers,
an insurgent movement whose broad-based military campaign against
the Sri Lankan State had successfully challenged its de facto if not its de
jure authority. On this basis, Subaskaran was similarly not in a position
to enjoy Convention protection in Germany.3' Finally, Aitseguer, because
he feared human rights abuses by Islamic extremists whom the Algerian
government could not control, would be denied protection in France.32
In practical terms, the basis for the applicants' petition to the United
Kingdom Court of Appeal was the possibility, and indeed the legal
necessity, of a different treatment of their cases in the United Kingdom.
This was the essential, if implied, basis of their appeal. Despite the fact
that Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer were or would likely be denied
asylum under the accountability theory, the result might be different
under the protection theory. In fact, for the very reason that these
individuals had no prospect of effective protection by a de facto governing
authority in their countries of origin, all three arguably had a special
claim to asylum under the protection theory, because while the
accountability theory requires a State of origin with the ability to protect,
the protection theory does not.
The Court of Appeal in ex parteAdan et al set out a consolidated analysis
of the relevant legal standards applicable to all three cases. The judgment
first identified the United Kingdom as an adherent to the protection
principle, like the majority of States party to the Refugee Convention,
27 Ibid., 2-3, citing the Dublin Convention, above n. 17 and related text.
28 Ibid., 7, 9, citing 1996 Act, s. 2(2)(c). Essentially the three applicants argued that neither

Germany nor France could be fairly characterized as safe countries of first asylum as required under
the terms of the 1996 Act. Compare ex parte Adan et al with T.L v. United 1ingdon, below n. 86 and
related text.
" Ibid., 2, 3.
30 Ibid., 2, 10.
"' Ibid., 3, 10.
32 Ibid., 2-3, 10.
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33

The analysis then
and consistent with the advice of UNHCR.
characterized both Germany and France as proponents of the minority
accountability theory, clarifying that where Germany only disqualifies
asylum seekers from so-called failed States where there is 'no possibility
of protection,' 34 France rejects asylum seekers even if the State is nominally
functional, so long as it 'is unable to provide protection' under given
circumstances.3 5
The heart of the Court of Appeal's decision lies in its principled
assessment of the protection and accountability theories. The Court
clarified that the problem with returning Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer
to Germany and France was not that those countries have an interpretation36
of the Refugee Convention 'at variance with the English jurisprudence.'
Rather, the Court insisted that there is 'a range of tolerance' that permits
States party to adopt different approaches to treaty provisions based on
their respective legal cultures. The problem with the German and French
accountability theories, and the Court did not put too fine a point on its
characterization, is that they are 'at variance with the Convention's true
interpretation.'3 7 In denying protection to victims of non-State persecution,
the Court ruled, these third countries are failing in their fundamental
duties to 'apply the Convention's international meaning [and] ... the
Convention's core values.' 38
In finding both the German and French variants of the accountability
theory to be in violation of the treaty, the United Kingdom Court of
Appeal declared the protection theory to be required by the Refugee
Convention. In so concluding, the Court provided a very clear articulation
of the protection theory itself:
... the issue we must decide is whether or not, as a matter of law, the scope of
Art. 1A(2) extends to persons who fear persecution by non-State agents in
circumstances where the State is not complicit in the persecution ... whether
because it is unwilling or unable ... to provide protection. We entertain no doubt
that such persons ... are entitled to the Convention's protections.39

The Court even went so far as to declare that if a State were to utilize
the accountability theory, because it is an incorrect interpretation of the
Refugee Convention as a matter of law, it would signify that 'the
Convention was not being applied at all.'40
In light of the distance that the Court of Appeal was willing to go in
33 Ibid., 9. See also above, Part I and nn. 7, 8 and 12 and related text.
34 ex parte Adan el al, Court of Appeal, 9-10.
3 Ibid., 10.
36 Ibid., 11.
31 Ibid., 15.

" Ibid., 13.
39 Ibid., 16; emphasis added.
40 Ibid., 15.
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condemning the accountability theory, it is significant, if not discouraging,
to proponents of the protection theory that the ultimate standard
articulated by the Court was more modest. The Court phrased its final
holding in a manner that arguably constrains the judicial mechanism for
blocking the transfer of victims of non-State persecution from the United
Kingdom to accountability theory jurisdictions.
In what might be characterized as an academic discussion offered to
assist future adjudicators in determining the application of the 1996 Act's
safe country provisions, 4' the Court of Appeal cited one of its own earlier
decisions regarding third country transfers, declaring that '[w]hat is
required is that there should be no real risk that the asylum seeker would
be sent to another country otherwise than in accordance with the
Convention.'42 The Court then proceeded to find that the accountability
theory is 'as a matter of law at variance with the Convention's true
interpretation.'43 However, the Court chose to culminate its decision, not
with this broad-based invalidation of the accountability theory, but with
the more qualified statement that 'the Secretary of State, in administering
s. 2(2)(c) of the Act of 1996, is only concerned with the question whether
there exists a real risk that the third country will refoule the refugee in
breach of the Convention."
One possible reading of the Court's reasoning in ex parte Adan is that
there is inherently and necessarily a 'real risk' that returning an asylum
seeker to a country utilizing the accountability theory will result in he or
she being returned from there to a situation of persecution; hence, such
third country transfers will be categorically ruled out. However, this seems
to involve a certain stretching of the 'real risk' standard, from a proprotection theory standpoint. While the 'real risk' test was satisfied in the
case of Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer, the standard is significantly less
stringent towards the Secretary of State than one which would forbid the
return of an asylum seeker from the United Kingdom to an accountability
theory jurisdiction under any circumstances.
In fact, counsel for the Secretary of State had argued in ex parte Adan
et al that Germany and France had alternative legal forms of relief from
refoulement that would ensure that the Convention was not violated in
practice, despite any denial of formal refugee status under the
accountability theory. Fortunately from the perspective of the applicants,
counsel was not able to provide meaningful evidence of 'the efficacy of
the[se] other forms of protection.'45 For this reason, the Court was not
41 See above, discussion in Part 2 and n. 26.
42 Ibid., 14, citing ex parte Canbolat (Court of Appeal) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1569, 1579A-C; emphasis

added.

43 ex parte Adan et al, Court of Appeal, at 15.
44 Ibid., 19. Emphasis added.
41 Ibid.
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required to resolve affirmatively whether the availability of temporary or
lesser forms of protection in lieu of asylum in third countries would satisfy
the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention or the 1996
Act.46 Rather, the Court of Appeal was able to conclude that the Secretary
of State must entertain the merits of the asylum applications of Adan,
Subaskaran and Aitseguer, and could not return them to Germany and
France.

3.1.2 Thejudgment of the House of Lords
3.1.2.1 Failed States, embattled States and the accountability theoy. After the
Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer, the

Secretary of State sought leave to appeal the cases of Adan and Aitseguer
in the House of Lords,47 not in order to effect the removal of Adan and
Aitseguer to Somalia and Algeria, respectively, but rather in order to
secure guidance from the House as to future cases involving alternative
applications of the accountability theory.48 As Lord Steyn specified,
the House gave leave to appeal in the cases of Adan and Aitseguer ... [to]
consider whether there is a material difference between a state where governmental authority
has collapsed (as is the case in Somalia) and a state where governmental authority exists
but is too weak to provide effective protection againstpersecution by non state actors (as is the
case in Algeria)."

The two applications of the accountability theory considered by the
House of Lords in ex parte Adan and Aitseguer might be termed the 'failed
State' and 'embattled State' alternatives.5" Under the failed State variant,

Germany denies asylum to applicants such as Adan from a handful of
dysfunctional and ungoverned countries like Somalia.5 In contrast, the
46

A UK court had occasion to assess the sufficiency of temporary protective measures in Greece,

in a later case in which two Algerian asylum seekers had alleged persecution by non-State agents;
see R v. Secretay of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bouheraoua and Kerkeb (Queen's Bench Division,
22 May 2000). In Bouheraoua, the High Court found that the temporary relief from removal available
under Greek law was insufficient to meet the standards of the 1951 Convention, and on that basis
reversed the Secretary of State's previous certification of the applicants' return from the United
Kingdom to Greece. Ibid., 8. The Court recognized that Algerian asylum claims were almost
universally denied in Greece (ibid., 2) and, moreover, that there was 'no evidence of any case in
which asylum has been granted to persons claiming non-state persecution' by Greek immigration
authorities. Ibid., 6. Most significantly, the Court found no evidence that the relevant temporary
protection available to denied asylum seekers - so-called 'humanitarian status' - had ever been
granted to an Algerian. Ibid., 7-8. On this basis, the Court concluded that 'there [was] a real risk
that asylum seekers who can establish a real risk of persecution from non-state agents ... may not
be Sermitted to stay in Greece on humanitarian grounds until that risk has passed.' Ibid., 8.
ex parteAdan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 11. Leave was not sought in Subaskaran's
case.
48 Ibid. Subaskaran's case was deemed to have 'added nothing to the issues' raised on appeal in
the other two cases. Ibid., para. 12.
49 Ibid., para. 11. Emphasis added.
50 See above, Part 2, no. 13, 14, 15, 34 and 35 and related text.
51 See the April and November 1997 judgments of the German Federal Administrative Court,
above Part 2, nn. 13 and 34 and related text. Such dysfunctional countries will likely lack international
recognition as States. See also ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion, paras. 2 and 6.
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broader embattled State alternative is the basis for the denial of asylum
in France and other accountability jurisdictions to applicants, such as
Aitseguer, from States like Algeria which, while functional, are unable to
provide individuals with effective protection from persecution by nonState agents.5 2 Of the two accountability alternatives, Germany's failed
State approach has a more limited application, and would serve to deny
asylum to refugees only when they feared persecution by non-State agents
in countries in which State authority was not only ineffective but also
non-existent.53 Having posed the question, the House held that the two
variants of the accountability theory are equally incorrect interpretations
of the international refugee definition. As Lord Steyn concluded:
The relevant autonomous meaning of article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention
is therefore as explained in Adan [I]. Like the Court of Appeal I would hold that
there is no material distinction between a country where there is no government
(like Somalia) and a country [where] the government is unable to afford the
necessary protection to citizens (such as Algeria). Both are covered by article
1(A)(2)., 4

Therefore with regard to the primary issue framed by Lord Steyn, the
House quite succinctly dismissed the accountability principle by directly
citing its own 1999 precedent in Adan I and squarely affirming the Court
of Appeal in ex parte Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer.
3.1.2.2 Third-countgy transfers under the 1951 Convention. In light of the relative
ease with which the House framed and resolved the main issue on appeal
in ex parte Adan and Aitseguer as described above, it is noteworthy that the
Law Lords also grappled extensively with what at first blush was a more
abstract and peripheral issue. Throughout all four of the separate opinions,
their Lordships probed the protection and accountability principles in
light of the so-called 'proper interpretation' of the Refugee Convention.55
As a threshold matter, they clarified their duty to interpret the Refugee
Convention and to instruct the Secretary of State as to their
determination.56 On this basis, the Law Lords repeatedly stressed that
52 See the 1992 decision of the Austrian immigration authority, above Part 2, no. 14 and 35 and

related text. Under the French approach, refugees from so-called embattled States will only be
granted asylum if their government 'tolerates or encourages the persecution by non-State agents': ex
parteAdan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion, para. 6.
53 See above nn. 13, 14, 34 and 35 and related text.
54 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 23, referring to the earlier decision
in
Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 A.C. 293 [hereinafter 'Adan l'].Lord Steyn's
opinion, characterized Adan I as 'authoritatively reject[ing] the accountability theory and adopting
the persecution theory.'
ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion, para. 14.
'6 Ibid., Lord Slynn's opinion, para. 13: the Secretary of State 'must carry out his obligation in
the way in which he is advised or told by the courts is right.' See also Lord Hobhouse's opinion,
para. 14: the court's interpretation of an international instrument 'must be respected'; Lord
Hobhouse's opinion, para. 8: in the absence of an interpretation of the Refugee Convention by the
International Court ofJustice, the House of Lords' decision is 'determinative'.
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the Conventional refugee definition has 'one true meaning,' 57 a 'true
construction,' 58 'one autonomous interpretation,'59 'an authoritative
interpretation,' a0 and an 'international meaning."'6 The Court then
affirmed the 'proper interpretation' of the Convention '[t]hat persecution
may be by bodies other than the State' as 'accepted in Adan [1].'62
Through a close reading it becomes clear that the essential ruling in
ex parte Adan and Aitseguer was not simply that the House of Lords would
continue to reject the accountability principle and would recognize thirdparty refugees from both failed and embattled States under the Adan I
protection principle. Rather, the Court also felt compelled to address a
deeper question: Was the United Kingdom prohibited from sending thirdparty refugees to accountability jurisdictions on the strength of that same
protection principle? With regard to the cases of Adan and Aitseguer,
the Law Lords responded with a resounding 'yes.'
The Secretary of State had argued before the House that there was
'a permissible range of interpretations' of the Refugee Convention,63
notwithstanding his agreement that Adan I was the proper rule in Great
Britain.64 Given this margin of appreciation, he maintained that he was
permitted to return Adan and Aitseguer to Germany and France as safe
countries of first asylum under s. 2(2)(c) of the 1996 Asylum and
Immigration Act, despite the likelihood that their claims would be denied
on accountability grounds.65 The Lords rejected the Home Secretary's
reasoning, most pointedly in the opinion of Lord Steyn:
The Secretary of State wrongly proceeded on the twin assumption that there is
a band of permissible meaning of article 1A(2) and that the practice hitherto
adopted in Germany and France falls within the permissible range. The Secretary
of State materially misdirected himself. His decisions must be quashed.66
57 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 17.

Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 21, citing Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Adan I at 305 C-D.
59 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 22; see also Lord Steyn's opinion, para.
16.
60 Ibid., Lord Hutton's opinion, para. 7, citing the Court of Appeal in exparte Adan et al at 1295-6.
61 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Hobhouse's opinion, para. 11, citing Lord Woolf in Kerrmuche v.
58

Home Secretag [1997] Imm. AR 610.
62 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Slynn's opinion, paras. 14 and 12; see also Lord Steyn's opinion,
para. 23.
63 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 1.
64 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 22.
65 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 7. See also above nn. 26-28 and related text. Cf. Ex parte
Adan and Aitsegune T.L v. U.K, below n. 86 and related text.
66 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 24. Also worthy of note is the Court's response to the reliance
placed by the Secretary of State on the 1996Joint Position ofthe European Union on the harmonized
application of the definition of the term refugee. The Joint Position tends to a pro-accountability
approach, requiring 'persecution by third parties' to be encouraged or permitted by the authorities
if it is to fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention ... ': para. 5.2. Lord Steyn economically
responded that '[c]ounsel [for the Secretary of State] put too much weight on this document': ex
parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 18. See also above n. 15. Lord Steyn's view is
supported by the position of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles [ECRE] in its analysis
of 'Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect - the German
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By addressing the practical exigencies of prospective third-country
transfers under domestic law, the House of Lords applied the Adan I
protection principle in a new context. In so doing, the Court confronted
the prospect of 'chain-reaction refoulements,' finding such indirect forced
returns in violation of article 33 of the 1951 Convention.67 In the words
of Lord Steyn:
it is a long standing principle of English law that if it would be unlawful to
return the asylum seeker directly to his country of origin where he is subject to
persecution ... it would be equally unlawful to return him to a third country

which it is known will return him to his country of origin.68
Lord Hutton went even further in proclaiming the non-refoulement principle
as 'an important human right ... notwithstanding that the State ... is
not complicit in [the feared] persecution.'69 He then concluded that
section 2 of the 1996 Act could not serve 'to take away that right from
Ms. Adan and Mr. Aitseguer,' and therefore that the Secretary of State
was prohibited from returning them to either Germany or France.70
3.1.3 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer -

Unfinished business?

While unanimously affirming the lower court's decision regarding Adan
and Aitseguer, it is significant that the House of Lords did not reiterate
the Court of Appeal's reasoning in all respects. Specifically, the House
of Lords did not rely upon the 'real risk' test cited by the lower
court. 7 1 Rather, the Law Lords unambiguously rejected the accountability
principle and overturned the Secretary of State's decisions to return Adan
and Aitseguer to Germany and France. In so doing, the Court clarified
that the protection theory is the correct interpretation of the Convention,
and protects third-party refugees from non-State persecution in both

Interpretation' (London, Sept. 2000) [ECRE NSA Report]: 'Apart from its non-binding nature, the
Joint Position can hardly be adduced as showing a consistent common state practice that favours
the strict application of the accountability theory': ECRE NSA Report at nn. 60-62 and related
text. Moreover, with regard to the potential negative impact of the House's decision on the EU
harmonization process, or as 'an implicit criticism of the judicial departments of Germany and
France,' Lord Steyn responded that 'Ct]he sky will not fall in.' 'National courts can only do their
best to minimize the disagreements. But ultimately they have no choice ... The House is bound to
take into account the obligations of the United Kingdom government ... ' (Lord Steyn's opinion,
para. 18).
" Art. 33 CSR51: 'No contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee ... to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened ...
68 ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 14.
69 Ibid., Lord Hutton's opinion, para. 11.
70

Ibid., Lord Hutton's opinion, paras. I I and 12.

71

While Lord Hutton indicated that the Secretary of State did not contest the 'real risk' that

Adan and Aitseguer would be returned by the German and French authorities to Somalia and
Algeria, respectively, the Lords did not set forth the 'real risk' test as the basis for their decision:
Lord Hutton's opinion, para. 7. Lord Steyn also commented on the insufficient evidence regarding
alternative forms of protection to asylum in Germany and France: Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 25.
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failed and embattled States.72 Moreover, ex parte Adan and Aitseguer
discourages 'chain-reaction refoulements' of refugees to likely persecution
by non-State agents by prohibiting indirect returns through accountability
jurisdictions.73
Nevertheless, the 'real risk' test cited by the Court of Appeal affirming its earlier decision in ex parte Canbolat74 - is largely untouched
by the House of Lords in ex parte Adan and Aitseguer.75 Therefore, despite
the success of the appellants in fighting their returns to Germany and
France, and the notable validation and extension of the protection theory
by the House of Lords, there may be a small but important piece of
unfinished business in the aftermath of ex parte Adan and Aitseguer.
The 'real risk' test re-articulated by the Court of Appeal in ex parte
Adan et al remains a factor in cases involving the possible transfer of
asylum seekers to third countries, particularly those which may have
specific measures for temporary protection falling short of the durable
status of asylum. The real risk test would appear to contemplate a casebased investigation of a State's interpretation and application of the
Refugee Convention which may, in practice, tolerate returns to
accountability theory jurisdictions.7 6 Because the House of Lords felt it
was in no position to evaluate the claimed alternative forms of protection
in Germany, arguably the real risk analysis became moot in Adan and
Aitseguer's case. 7 However, it was the very claim of meaningful
alternatives to asylum in Germany that led to a different outcome when
another third-party refugee petitioned the British Secretary of State, and
ultimately the European Court of Human Rights.
3.2 TI. v. The United Kingdom
TI. v. The United Kingdom involved a Sri Lankan who alleged past
persecution by both the LTTE insurgents and the Sri Lankan government,
as well as a fear of future persecution by both State and non-State agents
were he to be returned to Sri Lanka. 8 According to T.I.'s testimony, he
was first captured, interrogated and forced into servitude by the Tamil
Tigers over a two-year period. In 1995, after escaping from an LTTE
settlement, he was arrested by Sri Lankan soldiers on two different
7 Ibid., Lord Steyn's opinion, paras. 24, 23; see also para. 20, citing Lord Lloyd of Berwick in
Adan I at p. 306 A-B: 'for those who are sometimes called "third party refugees" ... if the state is
unable to provide protection ... the qualifications for refugee status are complete'. See also above
nn. 2 and 54 and related text.
73 See above section 3.1.2.1.
74 See above n. 42.
75 See above n. 71.
76 See ex parte Adan et al, Court of Appeal, 14 and 19; see also ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Lord

Steyn's opinion, para. 24: 'cases under the Refugee Convention are always particularly fact-sensitive'.
Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 25.
78 TI

v. United lingdom, above n. 13, 3-4.
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occasions, both leading to his interrogation regarding suspected LTTE
affiliation and numerous instances of torture, including severe beatings,
whippings and burnings. 79 A doctor involved in the treatment of torture
victims issued a report on T.I.'s behalf concluding that his extensive scars
as well as his psychological attributes were characteristic of survivors of
torture, and moreover that his testimony regarding the detention centres
in which allegedly he had been incarcerated in Sri Lanka were consistent
with descriptions given by other Sri Lankan asylum seekers.8 °
T.I. alleged a prospective fear of persecution upon return to Sri Lanka,
based upon ongoing suspicions that government officials likely would
form as to his LTTE association. In this context, his testimony graphically
highlighted the potential impact of his extensive scars, were he to be
returned to Sri Lanka. Not only might his scars brand him as a victim
of past torture and imputed involvement in insurgent activities, but they
might in turn provoke further suspicion and inhuman treatment in the
future. 8
T.I. claimed asylum in Germany in 1996 and his application was
denied, first by the State refugee status determination authority in 1996,
and then by an Administrative Court in Bavaria in 1997.82 The first
decision was grounded in the finding that T.I.'s alleged torture, if it
occurred, was due to 'excesses of isolated organs [that] ... cannot be
imputed to the Sri Lankan State.'83 The Administrative Court's denial,
on the other hand, was based on an unwillingness to attribute persecutory
acts by the Tamil Tigers to the Sri Lankan State, as well as an adverse
finding regarding T.I.'s credibility.84
With reference to the United Kingdom Court of Appeal's decision in
85
ex parte Adan, it may be noted that where Sittampalan Subaskaran
claimed a fear of non-State persecution, T.I. alleged both State and nonState persecution, which might be thought to strengthen his prospects in
an accountability jurisdiction. However, the German authorities not only
refused T.I. protection due to the non-State character of the Tamil
Tigers' abuse, as in Adan, but also out of an apparent refusal to attribute
acts by State officials to the State.
After the second adverse decision in his case, T.I. left Germany for
Italy and then the United Kingdom, where he claimed asylum in
September 1997. Analogous to the early stages of the asylum case of
Subaskaran, T.I.'s asylum claim was denied in 1998 by the Secretary of
71 Ibid., 3-4.
80 Ibid., 5-6.
81 Ibid., 5-6, 10.
12 Ibid., 4.
13 Ibid., 4.
8 Ibid., 4.
88 See above Part 2, and nn. 24 and 31.
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State without consideration on the merits, based on a finding under
section 2 of the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act that he was returnable
to Germany as a safe country of first asylum.8"
Unlike Mr Subaskaran, however, when T.I. appealed to the Court of
Appeal later in 1998, the Court upheld the Home Secretary's
determination, finding that he 'was entitled to conclude that the German
authorities do not adopt an approach ... outside the range of responses
of a Contracting State acting in good faith to implement its obligations
under the [Refugee] Convention.' 7 When T.I. was denied leave to appeal
to the House of Lords, he sought 'leave to remain ... on compassionate
grounds,' further judicial review on medical grounds, and a request for
reconsideration of his case based on the Court of Appeal decision in ex
parte Adan et al, all unsuccessfully."8
After being denied asylum by the Secretary of State and losing in the
Court of Appeal, T.I. petitioned the European Commission of Human
Rights in September 1998. He claimed that the United Kingdom, in
finding him removable to Germany, had violated a number of provisions
of the European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 3's
prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment.89 The Commission
transferred competence to examine T.I.'s application to the European
Court of Human Rights, and the Court's decision was rendered on 7
March 2000.90
Although asylum is not a subject of the European Convention, Article
3 has been interpreted by the Court to bar a country from returning an
individual to torture and inhuman treatment, in much the same way as
the Refugee Convention prohibits refoulement to likely persecution.9' In
fact, in Ahmed v. Austria, the European Court in 1996 blocked the return
of a Somali national to his country of origin, where he feared persecution
by a paramilitary faction led by the warlord General Aideed.
Ahmed is an important decision for the European Court, given that no
less than three vital legal principles emanate from this case. The Court
concluded in Ahmed that: (1) Article 3's prohibition against inhuman
treatment serves as protection against certain forms of persecution; (2) in
addition to prohibiting affirmative inhuman acts by a signatory, Article
3 also bars a signatory from returning an individual to a jurisdiction in
86 TI. v. United Kingdom, 4-5; also above nn. 26-8 and 65 and related text.
TL v. United Kingdom, 5.
8 Ibid., 5-6. T.I. made his request before the decision by the House of Lords to consider the
appeal of the Court of Appeal's decision in Ex parte Adan et al. Moreover, the UK Secretary of State
sought leave to appeal in the House of Lords, with respect to Adan and Aitseguer only, and not in
the case of Subaskaran.
'9 Ibid., 1, 12. Art. 3, 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR50), 4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS 222, ETS No. 5.
90 TL v. United Kingdom, 1.
9" Ibid., 15. Art. 33 CSR51.
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which such inhuman treatment may occur; and (3) Article 3 protects
against inhuman treatment by non-State agents as well as State officials. 2
The third Ahmed ruling is particularly significant, in that it borrows the
protection principle from international refugee law and applies it in the
context of human rights law and the European Convention. 93
Affirming its willingness to apply the second Ahmed principle to T.I.'s
threatened return to Germany, the Court held in TL v. UK., 'that the
indirect removal in this case to an intermediary country, which is also a
Contracting State, does not affect the responsibility of the United Kingdom
to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel,
exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.' 94 Moreover,
the Court recognized the inconsistency between its own jurisprudence
regarding protection from non-State human rights abuses, namely, the
third principles in the Ahmed case, and the accountability theory as utilized
by Germany to deny refugee protection where the State is not complicit
in the alleged persecution.9 5
Despite its apparent favourable application of Ahmed, as well as its
implicit condemnation of the German accountability theory, the European
Court refused to block the United Kingdom's removal of T.I. to Germany.
The reason for the Court's decision was ostensibly its finding that T.I.
would not necessarily be returned by Germany to Sri Lanka, despite his
denial of asylum. The Court examined several provisions of the German
Aliens Act, and concluded that T.I. might be eligible for one or more
alternative forms of protection which are not limited to victims of Statesponsored persecution.
In particular, the Court examined section 53(6) of the Aliens Act, 'which
grants a discretion to the [German] authorities to suspend deportation in
case of a substantial danger for life, personal integrity or liberty of an
alien. This applies to concrete individual danger resultingfrom either State or
private action.'9 6 The European Court found that T.I. would be eligible to
seek section 53(6) protection, and that 'the apparent gap in protection
resulting from the German approach to non-State agent risk is met, at

92 See generally, Ahmed v. Austria, 24 E.H.R.R. 278 (1996), paras. 10, 21, 35 and 41-47. See also
TI. o. United ingdom, 15, citing Ahmed. See also Soering v. United Kingdom, 16 E.H.R.R. (1989), para.
82, clarifying that a party to the European Convention is obligated 'not to put a person in a position
where he will or may suffer [inhuman] treatment or punishment'.
93 Compare Ahmed, above note, with ex parte Adan and Ailseguer, above nn. 3 and 12.
9' Ibid., 16.
95 Ibid., 9 and 10, citing the decision of the German Federal Administrative Court decision of
15 April 1997 and Ahmed. See also above n. 13.
9" Ibid., 10, emphasis added. The Court goes on to specify that in early 1999, twenty-four Sri
Lankans benefited from section 53(6) protection, all of whom alleged non-State sources of danger.
Unlike T.I., however, none of these individuals had sought temporary protection after being denied
asylum in the first instance. Ibid., 18.
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least to some extent, by the application by the German authorities of
section 53(6).'
In order to reconcile the Court's willingness to apply Article 3 of the
Convention to block deportations that may result in inhuman treatment
in another country, with its unwillingness to block T.I.'s return to
Germany, it may be useful to examine the Court's qualification of its
earlier statement of Ahmed principle #2. Like the UK Court of Appeal in
ex parte Adan et al, the European Court does not state that the mere
possibility of treaty violations is sufficient to find that individuals may
never be returned to a particular jurisdiction. Rather, the Court states
that Article 3 'imposes an obligation on the Contracting States not to
expel a person to a country where substantial grounds have been shown
for believing that he would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment
contrary to Article 3.
Just as it articulates the Ahmed principle in the form of a 'real risk' test,
the Court phrases its final determination that T.I. may be returned to
Germany in terms of a negative assessment of his likelihood of return by
Germany to Sri Lanka: 'the Court finds that it is not established that
there is a real risk that Germany would expel the applicant to Sri Lanka
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.' 99
The good news in TL is that Article 3 of the European Convention
is still held to prohibit return to persecution by non-State agents [Ahmed
principle #3], and that the Court requires a signatory State like Germany
to provide alternatives to asylum in the case of victims of non-State agents
of persecution. The more sobering news is that the Court was willing to
deny protection to T.I. on the basis of a purely discretionary form of
relief from deportation, despite the fact that the German government
had 'not provided any example of section 53(6) being applied to a failed
asylum seeker in a second asylum procedure.'" °" Moreover, the Court
does not address the very real disadvantage that even if section 53(6)
protection were provided to T.I., it amounts to a temporary suspension
of deportation, rather than a conference of durable legal status on a par
with asylum.

"7 Ibid., 17-18. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles does not share the confidence of
the European Court regarding the efficacy of section 53(6) of the German Aliens Act. In its recent
study of German policy regarding third-party refugees, it noted that '[i]n 1999, of the applicants for
political asylum in Germany ... [o]nly 1.55% were granted the temporary suspension of deportation
pursuant to Section 53 of the Aliens Act.' 2000 ECRE NSA Report at n. 6 and related text. See
also above n. 66.
98 TL v. United Kingdom, 15, citing Ahmed, paras. 39-40; emphasis added. Compare ex parteAdan et
al at 14, above n. 42.
99 T.I v. United Kingdom, 19, emphasis added.
'00 Ibid., 18. See also above nn. 71 and 97.
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4. Conclusion
TI. v. The United Kingdom - together with the domestic proceedings in
the United Kingdom that preceded it - illustrates the vulnerability of a
refugee protection regime that lacks consensus regarding the status of
victims of non-State agents of persecution. The abstract right of all
refugees to protection may be proclaimed, and the withholding of asylum
to victims of non-State agents may be officially condemned, while de
facto returns to persecution are tolerated. So long as the accountability
theory is applied, even in a limited number of jurisdictions, the rights of
third-party refugees may be honoured in the breach.
The 'real risk' in allowing returns to accountability jurisdictions lies
not only in the very real possibility of chain-reaction returns to persecution
in the case of individual asylum seekers, but also in the propagation and
perpetuation of a double standard that will negatively impact far greater
numbers of refugees. The principle of non-discrimination, enshrined in the
Refugee Convention and international human rights law more generally,''
does not tolerate an interpretation of the refugee definition that forces
victims of non-State persecution to rely on the discretionary kindness of
temporary relief from forced return rather than the durable protection
of asylum. Thus the strongest principled and practical statement that
protection adherents can make in the face of accountability doctrine is
in refusing to return asylum seekers to accountability jurisdictions, as
demonstrated by the House of Lords in ex parte Adan and Aitseguer °2

11 Art. 3 CSR51. See also art. 2 ICCPR66; art. 14 ECHR50.
102 See ex parte Adan andAitseguer, Lord Steyn's opinion, para. 24. In this regard, ex parte Bouheraoua
is another favourable indication of the United Kingdom's willingness to bar the removal of victims
of non-State persecution to accountability jurisdictions, at least where the available form of temporary
protection in the country of first asylum is denied to members of a particular nationality on a
categorical basis. See above n. 46.

